South Yorkshire Times, June 27th, 1942.

Dangerous Corner                                          

We are in a tight corner again. Within the week the news from North Africa has clarified itself with sinister emphasis. Worsted by Rommel once more we are back where our frail forces faced the original Italian Army, which under Graziani crossed the Egyptian frontier. This time the thrust is immeasurably more serious, the attackers better led and better equipped. On the other hand our own Eighth Army is still in being, and a determined and by no means disarmed force in addition to four hundred miles of desert stands between the Germans and the Nile. It is a grievous set-back and, after our months of preparation for the campaign, infinitely more exasperating than the Malayan defeats.

In that case risks had to be taken under pressure of the supply position; in this we had time, though not too much, to strengthen our arms and fortify our positions. But galling as the reverse is Parliament will be wasting its time if it picks up one half of the trails so ingeniously started by critics who seek a scapegoat. Passing over the numerous points of detail in which the conduct of our side of the battle has been criticised we come up against the twin obstacles of supply and strategy which have been our stumbling blocks ever since the war started. The obvious efficacy of the German method of concentrating maximum force and fire power at a given place and time cannot have escaped those responsible on our side for the direction of the war. It follows, therefore, that we are still not quite able to match our adversary in this particular.

For this state of affairs we have to thank the supply handicap with which we started the war and which like all stern chases is a long one, and the heavy geographical handicap of exterior lines of communication. Even the mounting crescendo of our arms output and that of America cannot within a few months  achieve massive concentrations of material in Russia, India, the Middle East, Australia, and our own islands. The arms when made have to be transported over prodigious distances by routes constantly harried by the enemy. It has been proved time and time again that to beat the Germans on land our troops must have equally good weapons in equally large quantities. Our men can hardly be expected to manage with less. The German way, which we must strive our utmost to emulate, is to contrive to meet their opponents with the odds in numbers and weight of armament decisively in their favour. In Libya most of our tanks and anti-tank guns were inferior to those of the Germans, Time and distance had not permitted the newest material to be brought into play in decisive quantities. It was thought that in manpower we had at least parity, but the speed of Rommel’s recovery suggests that he had more up his sleeve than we suspected. Apparently our assessment of the effects of the neutralisation of Malta was not exact enough. Against a less astute leader than Rommel the gallantry and stubbornness of our men might have overcome these disadvantages, but all the its and buts of the amateur tacticians will not alter the fact that the German Army is grimly efficient wherever it fights, and will be outmatched only by more and better weapons massed and used at carefully selected times and places —where possible of our own choosing.

A salutory conditioning of the recent atmosphere of optimism which had become discernible is one result of the Libyan development. The Middle East has become a dangerous corner where we must at all costs stand fast while this fresh jolt is capitalised into the arms and ships which we cannot make too fast. The Axis is fast reaching the stage of whip and spur, and woe betide us if we fail to respond to the challenge